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Periodic sharp sustained increases and then reversals in asset prices lead many to posit irrational
price bubbles. The general case for irrationality is that real asset prices simply have moved too much
given the future real cash flows the assets are reasonably likely to produce. A corollary for property
is that observed mean reversion in real cash flows is not reflected in investor valuations, resulting
in asset values being too high when real cash flows are high and vice versa. In this paper we
interpret, critique and extend existing analyses of movements in real commercial property prices
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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Sharp price reversals in commercial property values during the early 1990s have raised questions 
regarding the rationality of property markets.  Real office values in the OECD countries fell by an average 
of 55 percent between the late 1980s/early 1990s peak and the trough after nearly doubling between 1985 
and the peak (Hendershott, Hendershott and Ward, 2003).  The boom in technology and internet stocks in 
the late 1990s and subsequent reversal raised even greater concerns regarding the rationality of stock 
markets (Shiller, 2000).  That is, many argue that asset bubbles – sharp, temporary price increases that 
cannot be plausibly explained by changes in fundamental value drivers – have occurred. 
A number of alternatives to blind irrationality can explain property price spikes.  First, expected 
rates of growth in real cash flows and real discount rates may move abruptly, causing fundamental values 
to change similarly.  Moreover, high transactions costs and long construction periods could prevent rapid 
supply responses to gaps between fundamental value and replacement cost, rationalizing high market 
values (transactions costs are generally far higher and production periods far longer for direct property 
than for stocks).  That is, sharp real property price cycles may in fact be fully rational. 
Second, principal-agent problems could cause agents rationally to bid prices significantly above 
fundamental value.  To illustrate, large scale investments are typically undertaken by financial institutions 
where those making the investment decisions are not those whose money is being invested.  Because the 
agents making the investments are rewarded on short-term relative performance and feel they are unable 
to predict the timing (rather than incidence) of a price reversal (Schifler and Vishney, 1998), agents may 
continue buying (or at least may not sell) even when they believe that market prices are above their 
‘fundamental’ values.  If agents sell too soon and the market keeps rising, they will incur negative relative 
performance.  On the other hand, if they are still in the market along with competitors when it collapses, 
there will be no differential performance.  Keeping an eye on competitors means that once the market   3 
begins to turn, everyone wants out and collapse become self-fulfilling (Ball, Lizieri and MacGregor, 
1998). 
Third, minor degrees of irrationality, what is often called “bounded rationality”, may exist.  While 
economic theory provides limited guidance about what particular elements of irrationality exist among 
investors, a number of papers show that limited deviations from full rationality can lead prices to deviate 
from fundamental values in predictable ways.  Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) focus on investor 
conservatism – the reluctance to update beliefs in the face of new information – and Daniel, Hirshleifer 
and Subrahmanyam (1998) focus on overconfidence – the tendency to overestimate the quality of one’s 
own information – as particular cognitive biases that can affect asset prices.  Scheinkman and Xiong 
(2003) show how overconfidence combined with short-sale constraints can lead to asset bubbles.  Hong 
and Stein (1999) argue that when information diffuses slowly, simple momentum strategies are profitable 
on average, which cause prices to overshoot fundamental values.  That is, not only can investors’ 
cognitive biases lead to bubbles, interactions between unbiased, but limited perspective, agents can lead 
to bubbles. 
In this paper we examine, interpret, and critique studies of rationality in commercial property 
markets.  These studies can be divided into three groups.
1  First, there are a number of comparisons of 
movements in real property prices and real cash flows that question whether the cash flow movements can 
reasonably justify the asset price shifts.  Such studies include Bjorklund and Soderberg (1999), 
Hendershott (1996 and 2000) and Quigley (1999) and cover the Swedish, Australian and Asian property 
markets, respectively.  All conclude that the ratios of value to cash flow were too high at the cyclical 
peak, i.e., that bubbles occurred. 
                                                            
1 While a substantial, growing literature on housing bubbles exists, the owner-occupant nature of this market makes 
analysis of it fundamentally different from markets for purely investment assets.  More specifically, the purchase of 
another bond or stock has no impact on the cash flow rate of return on existing holdings.  In contrast the purchase of 
a second house substantially lowers the cash flow (implicit rent) rate of return one receives from the original house, 
which is no longer occupied year around.  Similarly, there are obviously large declines in cash flow rates of return 
from owners occupying larger and larger residences.   4 
Second are empirical analyses of capitalization rates, the key test being whether cap rates have 
been positively related to deviations between actual and trend real cash flows.  Because real cash flows 
are clearly and necessarily trend reverting, actual cash flows above trend imply slower future real cash 
flow growth and thus higher cap rates.  Using NCREIF data, both Sivitanides et. al. (2001) and 
Hendershott and MacGregor (2005b) contend that US investors behaved irrationally because 
capitalization rates were lower (value/NOI ratios higher) the further real cash flows were above trend.  In 
contrast, Hendershott and MacGregor (2005a) provide evidence of rational expectations of mean 
reversion in UK office and retail markets. 
Third, variance bounds tests of actual and fundamental values and tests of the cointegration of 
real values and real cash flows have been borrowed from the finance literature.  Scott (1990) and Brooks 
et. al. (2001) apply the variance bounds tests to US REIT and UK property company share price data, 
respectively.  Lui and Mei (1994) and Wang (2000) report cointegration tests using US REIT and UK 
property share prices, respectively.  The variance bounds tests provide strong evidence of property 
bubbles, while the cointegration tests rebuke the existence of bubbles.  However, neither type of test 
seems very convincing. 
This paper is divided into five sections and a conclusion.  We begin with a general discussion of 
market pricing in asset markets and problems peculiar to the valuation of direct or nonsecuritized 
commercial real estate.  Next we discuss fundamental value and some claims that it has significantly 
deviated from the market value of commercial property in Asia, Australia and Sweden.  In Section III we 
turn to tests of rationality based on empirical analyses of capitalization rates in the US and the UK.  
Section IV reviews Hall’s analysis (2001) of the rationality of US equity valuation and applies Hall-type 
tests to capitalization rate data from the UK office and retail property markets.  Section V considers the 
formal finance related tests, questioning the assumptions underlying variance bounds tests of rationality in 
securitized property markets and the value of cointegration tests for bubbles.  Section VI concludes. 
 
   5 
I.  Market Pricing 
The standard model of market prices has fully rational individuals buying (selling) when market 
prices fall below (rise above) their fundamental value estimates (see, for example, Shleifer and Summers, 
1990).  Savvy investors recognize that their estimates contain errors, which makes them unwilling to 
buy/sell large amounts of the asset unless prices deviate significantly from what they perceive to be true 
value.  How much an investor is willing to commit beyond a particular asset position depends on their 
degree of risk-aversion and wealth (and ability to borrow), as well as the size of their current asset 
position.  Investors’ flow demand (supply) schedules – how much an investor will buy/sell at a particular 
price – will create an increasing demand for an asset as its price falls and increased selling as the asset 
price rises.  Consequently, prices should be fairly stable in the absence of new information – as price rises 
in response to an influx of buyers, the asset becomes less attractive to existing holders (both because of 
the higher price and the higher value of their holdings), creating willing sellers that limit the price 
increase. 
The standard model encompasses investors disagreeing about fundamental values – when 
investors have different opinions, the market price will reflect their willingness and ability to trade. 
Essentially, investors vote their beliefs based on their capital.  If most investors believe an asset is 
undervalued, their willingness (eagerness) to buy causes the price to rise.  Investors who are generally 
correct about when assets are over/undervalued tend to make money, creating a feedback mechanism that 
improves price setting over time (better investors accumulate more capital, garnering more “votes”).  This 
model would seem to rule out asset bubbles as well as the observed tendency for asset real prices and 
returns to be autocorrelated over short time horizons (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and mean reverting 
over long horizons (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001). 
But Hong and Stein (1999) show that slight modifications to the standard model can generate the 
autocorrelation and reversion characteristics observed.  Hong and Stein partition investors into two 
groups: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders”:   6 
Neither type is fully rational in the usual sense.  Rather, each is boundedly rational, with the 
bounded rationality being of a simple form: each type of agent is only able to “process” some 
subset of the available public information. The newswatchers make forecasts based on signals 
that they privately observe about future fundamentals; their limitation is that they do not 
condition on current or past prices.  Momentum traders, in contrast, do condition on past price 
changes.  However, their limitation is that their forecasts must be “simple” (i.e., univariate) 
functions of the history of past prices. (pp. 2144-45). 
 
Because private information diffuses gradually across the newswatcher population, prices adjust 
slowly to new information (there is autocorrelation or momentum in asset real prices and returns).  
Because momentum traders use simple strategies, the momentum in real prices is magnified, causing 
them to overshoot (momentum traders tend to make money early in the cycle and lose it late when the 
“bubble” bursts).  That is, real prices eventually revert to their fundamental values.
2  
In any market high selling costs and/or difficulties in selling short will limit the ability of those 
inclined to sell (and, where possible, short sell).
3  Selling costs include taxes on sales value (“stamp 
duties”) and on capital gains, the recapture of tax depreciation, and brokerage fees.  These costs – which 
tend to be substantially higher for commercial real estate than stocks – would allow prices to exceed 
fundamental value by large percentages without enticing holders to sell or others to try to short.  
Moreover, the possibility that the market is on the leading edge of a momentum-driven price surge 
discourages selling (and especially shorting) even by investors whose market value exceeds their 
perceived value (see, for example, Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). 
On the other hand, easy production of additional substitutable assets would inhibit large 
deviations of price from fundamental value.  For example, the issuance of new corporate shares (IPOs and 
secondary offerings) in booming markets should limit stock market bubbles.  Ofek and Richardson (2003) 
establish a cross section relation between new share availability and price declines – individual internet 
                                                            
2 Capozza, Hendershott and Mack (2004) present results explaining real house prices for a panel of US cities that are 
consistent with this model.  On an annual basis, real house prices adjust only about 50 percent to changes in 
fundamental values, and real prices exhibit strong serial correlation and mean reversion.  At the mean values of 
autocorrelation and mean reversion, actual prices overshoot fundamental prices by 20 percent, but with 
autocorrelation a standard deviation above the mean and mean reversion a standard deviation below, 70 percent 
overshooting occurs. 
3 Ofek and Richardson (2003) document the unusually high costs of shorting internet stocks during the late 1990s.   7 
stocks underperform a broad internet index by as much as 33% over six-month periods in which new 
shares become available – and hypothesize that the creation of new shares played a crucial role in ending 
the internet stock market bubble.  However, constraints on efforts to create additional properties when 
value exceeds replacement cost (e.g., planning restrictions and limited land supply) might permit large 
price-value gaps in commercial real estate. 
The role of new supply in controlling the gap between price and fundamental value is illustrated 
in Figure 1.  The two lines are an index of dot.com stocks (scaled to unity at the end of 1996) and the 
number of internet IPOs by month over the 1997-2001 period (the data in Figure 1 are discussed in 
Hendershott, Hendershott and Ward, 2003).  Both the large stock price gains and the sharp plunge that 
followed are clear.  Prices rose more than 400 percent annually from May 1997 to April 1999 (they were 
up nine-fold by late 1998), oscillated for eight months, and fell almost 85 percent during 2000.  Internet 
IPOs moved similarly.  After never reaching double digits during 1997 and 1998, internet IPOs jumped in 
early 1999 and averaged 31 per month between May 1999 and March 2000 (typically 30 to 40 IPOs are 
issued monthly in all industries).  These issues likely stressed the financial resources of buyers of internet 
stocks and contributed to the price reversal. 
Gentry and Mayer (2003) provide another example of security supply responding to gaps between 
price and fundamental asset value.  Their Figure 3 plots both the ratio of share prices to estimates of the 
(appraised) net asset value of REIT real assets and the dollar volumes of REIT share issues and 
repurchases.  While the 1992-95 data do not strongly reveal the expected pattern, the 1996-2000 data 
certainly do.  When REITs were 10 to 25 percent “over-priced” in 1996-97, share issues doubled from the 
1992-95 average.  When the price/value ratio slipped to 1.05 in 1998, issues plummeted and repurchases 
rose.  And when the ratio fell below unity in 1999-2000, repurchases far exceeded issues. 
The stock of commercial properties also responds to differences between real property values and 
their replacement cost.  But the lengthy lag in bringing new product to market, especially for large 
developments, extends the period in which excess real cash flows will be earned and thus rationalizes 
higher prices.  Further, development is often funded with lines of credit where developers put their equity   8 
into the project before credit is made available.  This creates an option-like position that virtually 
guarantees eventual completion of developments once a loan is negotiated and the property developer has 
spent his contribution.  Even if the underlying economics of the property market sour, the developer has 
little incentive to curtail construction because any additional loss will accrue totally to the lender.  Thus, 
the creation of new assets in a property boom may continue well after the boom ends, driving value far 
below replacement cost.  In contrast, hundreds of planned initial public offerings were “pulled” after the 
stock market reversal in 2000 and 2001.  Moreover, there is no equivalent to REIT repurchases and little 
scope (at least in the short term) to reduce the supply of a particular real property type.
4 
 
II.  Some Estimates of Fundamental Value and Claims of Investor Irrationality 
The fundamental value, FV, of an asset is the present value of future cash flows expected by 
marginal investors.






















FV             (1) 
 
where R is net rent (for simplicity we assume triple net leases so tenants pay all expenses), v is the 
vacancy rate, and i is the discount rate.  If rent is in real terms, then i is the real discount rate; if rent is 
nominal, i is the nominal discount rate.  For securitized real estate, the numerator is replaced by expected 
real cash flow payouts, CFs.  Utilizing (1) to obtain fundamental value estimates is no simply task.  In 
effect, processes driving expectations of R, v, and i need to be specified. 
Regarding the cash flow process, both corporate (dividends) and property (net rents) real cash 
flows are simultaneously autocorrelated and mean or trend reverting.  Positive autocorrelation means that 
                                                            
4 In the medium term, properties in excess supply could be converted to alternative uses.  To illustrate, some offices 
were converted to apartments in London following the 1989-90 crash in office values.   9 
when real cash flows are rising, they tend to continue to rise in the short term and vice-versa.  For 
example, if there is a positive demand shock, the shortage of space will compound as existing leases 
rollover until newly-developed properties begin opening.  Mean or trend reversion means that in the 
longer term cash flows are pulled toward an equilibrium level.  That is, after real rents rise (fall) in 
response to a positive (negative) shock, the rolling over of existing leases and new development 
(absorption) will eventually drive real rents back to their equilibrium level.
6 
Wheaton and Torto (1994) provide evidence on mean reversion in real US cash flows. 
Hendershott (1996) and Hendershott and MacGregor (2005a) present similar evidence on real office 
market rents in Sydney and London; real rents doubled in London and tripled in Sydney during the 
second half of the 1980s and fell by two-thirds in the early 1990s. 
Hendershott (1996 and 2000) computed fundamental value for the Sydney office market during 
the turbulent 1985-95 period.  He specified equilibrium real rent based on a user cost of capital 
calculation and estimated a real rental adjustment equation that provided a long-run equilibrium vacancy 
rate as well as an equation for forecasting real rents from lagged gaps between equilibrium and actual real 
rents and vacancy rates.  The key to the study was the availability of confidential data on forecasts of 
vacancy rates during the crucial 1989-92 years.  Hendershott constructed rolling future expected real cash 
flows from the vacancy rate forecasts and the rent forecasting equation and then computed a fundamental 
value series from equation (1).  He found the observed surge and reversal of real Sydney office values in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s to be grossly inconsistent with this fundamental value series.  In effect, 
market value rose to twice fundamental value before reversing. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
5 This is, of course, a simplification.  To the extent that the asset contains options for the owner, the values of these 
must be added. 
6 The argument regarding real corporate dividends is similar (Shiller, 1981, and Barsky and DeLong, 1992).  Price-
earnings ratios (P/E) – and, consequently, earnings yields (E/P) – are determined by market opportunities, growth 
and profit margin.  A high P/E (low E/P) signifies that these firms enjoy relatively high margins and/or growth 
opportunities.  However, these will attract competition, reducing incumbent firms’ profit margins and future growth 
opportunities and thus P/E ratios.  Because of lags between positive shocks and new corporate competitors entering 
a market, real earnings, as well as real rents, are positively auto-correlated in the short-term, mean reverting 
(negatively correlated) in the long-term, and cyclical.   10 
While numerous assumptions underlay Hendershott’s computations (including the constancy of 
real interest rates) and thus create uncertainty regarding their precision, the basic mispricing in Sydney is 
evident in Figure 2, where real office rents and the BOMA value/rent ratio are plotted.  Both are scaled to 
20 in 1985, when the market was in reasonable balance (real rents had doubled from the trough in 1977 
and the vacancy rate equaled 2.6 percent, down from 12 percent in 1978).  A further 40 percent rise in 
real rents through 1989 was associated with a more than 40 percent rise in value as the value/rent ratio 
rose.  This is inconsistent with rationality.  With expected mean reversion in real rents, the value/rent ratio 
should have fallen as the rent peak approached, rather than continued to rise after the peak.  The extended, 
smoothed downward-sloped dashed line in the figure would be consistent with rational pricing.  This 
simple analysis supports Hendershott’s calculations.  The value/rent ratio in 1990 should have been about 
half of that observed; market value was about double fundamental value. 
Bjorklund and Soderberg (1999) and Quigley (1999) made comparable observations about 
value/rent ratios in Swedish and Asian real estate markets, respectively.  Bjorklund and Soderberg 
examined the 1985-94 cycle in Swedish property and concluded that the ratio of property values to rents 
increased too much in the late 1980s.  While real rent and real price increased equally between 1983 and 
1986, roughly doubling, real rents increased by only 24 percent more through 1990, far less than the 144 
percent surge in real price.  Quigley argued that value/rent ratios were far out of line for offices in Kong 
Kong and Singapore, for retail in Hong Kong, and for condominiums in Jakarta in the middle 1990s.  
Especially telling is that these extraordinarily high ratios existed in the face of forecasted large increases 
in supply and vacancies, which certainly should have predicted large declines in real cash flows. 
 
III.  Mean Reversion and Capitalization Rates: Contrasting Evidence from the US and the UK 
If cash flow is expected to grow at a constant rate g forever and the discount rate is expected to be 
constant for all time at i, then equation (1) reduces to the Gordon growth model:  





= .                (2) 
 
where CF is the next period cash flow.  This equation holds whether i and g are both defined as real rates 
or as nominal rates (in what follows we interpret them as real rates).  The ratio of this cash flow to price 
or value, the “cap” rate, is just the difference between the discount rate and the growth rate.  And the 
“price/earnings” ratio (the ratio of value to cash flow) is just the inverse of the cap rate. 
If investors understand that real cash flows are mean reverting, they will expect high growth 
when real cash flow is low and low growth when real cash flow is high, i.e., g is a negative function of the 
ratio of real CF to its mean CFMean and 




g i cap - = .              (3) 
 
With growth depending negatively on the ratio, the cap rate should vary positively with the ratio.  That is, 
to compensate for the expected reversion in real cash flows, investors should apply relatively high cap 
rates to high real cash flows and relatively low cap rates to low real cash flows.  Thus, investigations of 
capitalization rates provide evidence on expected mean reversion and investor rationality generally. 
Sivitanides et.al. (2001) investigated the log of annual office capitalization rates from the 
NCREIF data base in 14 U.S. metropolitan areas during the 1984-2000 period.  The primary economic 
determinants of the cap rate were two real rent series, the ratio of real rent to its average over the 1980-99 
period (to capture mean reversion) and the annual growth rate in real rent (to capture autocorrelation).  
However, the real rent ratio had a negative coefficient, suggesting that when real rents were high, 
investors expected them to go higher and thus they capitalized current rent with a lower than normal cap 
rate (unreported results for other property types were similar).  This is, of course, the opposite of what 
investors should do if they expect real rents to revert to the mean.  Wheaton et. al. (2001, pp. 26-27) 
summarize the argument for inefficient property markets.   12 
Actually, this evidence on inefficiency is weaker than it appears because the rent ratio is lagged 
two years.  (If property cycles were four years in duration, two up and two down, rationality would imply 
a negative relation between current capitalization rates and the ratio of real rents two years ago to the 
mean.)  It is a negative relation between cap rates and the current rent ratio that would be especially 
troubling.  Using comparable data, Chen, Hudson-Wilson and Nordby (2004) show that the negative 
relationship does hold concurrently.
7  However, they interpret the ratio of current to mean real rent as a 
determinant of the risk premium required on real estate, not of the expected real cash flow growth rate.  
They argue that lower premiums are required in “hot” markets and thus that the negative coefficient on 
the ratio is consistent with rationality.  We find it most implausible that a lower risk premium would 
rationally be required the greater is the downside risk to real cash flows (was it rational to assume that 
equities were less risky at their peak in early 2000 than earlier?), much less that the premium impact 
would be greater than the positive impact on the cap rate through a lower expected real growth rate. 
Hendershott and MacGregor (2005b) have taken another look at the NCREIF data.  In spite of 
using supposedly better capitalization rates (deleting those based on stale appraisals) and analyzing 
supposedly better panels of data and deleting early observations (both adjustments being designed to 
reduce NOI growth outliers), they found the same negative relationship held between capitalization rates 
and the ratio of real NOI to its trend value.  Based on the NCREIF real cash flow data, US investors 
appear to have behaved irrationally in that they have not factored expectations of mean reversion of real 
cash flows into their asset pricing as reflected in capitalization rates (using Torto-Wheaton market rent 
data gives the same result).
8  In fact, investors appear to have been willing to pay more for a dollar of real 
                                                            
7 They analyze an office panel of 14 MSAs, 13 of which are similar to those of Sivitanides et. al. (2001); they use 
data from the 1982-02 period. 
8 Proxies for the log deviation of real NOI from its trend value are, in fact, reasonable correlates of the observed 
growth in real cash flow over the next five years.  We investigate the validity of the proxies by correlating actual 
real NOI growth over the next five years with two measures of the divergence of real NOIs from trend values: the 
log deviation of real NOI from its tread value and the ratio of TW real rent to mean TW real rent.  The correlations 
for the 1986.1-1998.1 period are negative: the more positive is the deviation or the ratio, the lower is future growth.  
The average correlation coefficient for the property types (average of six MSAs for offices and retail and ten for 
industrial) are -0.71 for offices and about -0.6 for retail and industrial.   13 
cash flow when that flow was rationally expected to erode in the future than they would pay when the 
flow was rationally expected to increase. 
The problem implicit in these data is illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, where we have plotted 
NCREIF capitalization rates in Southern California against the deviations of real NOI from trend for both 
industrial and office properties.  Rationality suggests a positive relation.  That is, the further real NOI is 
above trend, the less rapidly we should expect it to grow and thus the less we should be willing to pay for 
a dollar of it (the higher should capitalization rates be).  The relation is consistently negative, not positive, 
for both the office and industrial markets.  Similar relationships exist for numerous other US regions. 
In contrast to the analysis of US NCREIF data, evidence from the UK office and retail markets 
suggests that UK investors did build mean or trend reversion into their valuations.  Hendershott and 
MacGregor (2005a) relate cap rates to both the recent growth in real rents and the deviation of current real 
rent from its trend value.  Here the deviation enters positively, implying that when real rents were high 
investors expected them to fall and thus applied a high capitalization rate to the temporarily high current 
rent.  This holds for both office and retail valuations.  The capitalization and rent series are for 
hypothetical new buildings newly let at market rents and are thus not confounded by the problems of 
existing lease structures, headline rents diverging from effective rents, etc. 
Data for UK real office rents and value/rent ratios are plotted in Figures 5 and 6.  Contrast these 
with the similar graph for Sydney (Figure 2), where the office value/rent ratio rose rapidly with real rents 
and did not reverse itself until after real rents began to collapse.  In the UK, the ratios did not rise as 
sharply as real rents rose and turned down before real rents did, as we would expect to be the case in 
rational markets. 
Hendershott and MacGregor (2005a) illustrate the success of their estimation by showing the 
correspondence of their dynamically simulated cap rate with the actual cap rate.  In the dynamic 
simulation the lagged cap rate that feeds into the adjustment equation is the cap rate simulated from the 
previous period, rather than the actual previous period cap rate.  They then convert the simulated cap rates 
into real values by dividing them into real market rents.  Their model explains virtually all of the 1985-89   14 
increases in office and retail real values and the entire subsequent decline.  That is, there is little cyclical 
value change to attribute to irrationality.  At least for the UK, the late 1980s-early 1990s boom and bust is 
captured with a rational model. 
 
IV.  Applying Hall’s US Stock Market Tests to UK Property Prices 
Hall (2001) provides some innovative tests of rationality of the aggregate US stock market during 
the last decade based upon the inverse of the cap rate, the price/earnings ratio.  Hall performs two 
calculations of variants of equation (3).  In this section we discuss his methodology and apply it to the UK 
property market. 
In one calculation, Hall computes the nominal cash flow growth rate implied by the financial 
markets and compares it to the 5-year forward growth rate in nominal (not real) cash flows.  With cap 
equaling i - g and i being the sum of the default-free rate d and a risk premium prem, the growth rate 
implied by the financial markets is g = d + prem - cap.  Hall uses the 10-year Treasury rate for d, sets 
prem at 0.082 (the value that equates d+prem to the average ex post nominal return on US stocks over the 
period), and computes cap as the ratio of the value of corporate securities to corporate cash flow (after-tax 
profits plus interest payments).  He then solves for his “financial market” g and compares it to actual five-
year future nominal growth.  The closeness of the two series is a joint test of three hypotheses: if the risk 
premium has been constant, if five-year future nominal growth approximates expected future nominal 
growth, and if the stock market were rationale, then these two series should be closely correlated. 
Comparison of this nominal financial market g and the 5-year forward nominal growth rate in 
cash flows (Hall’s Figure 9) reveals a positive relationship, although the correlation is loose to put it 
gently.  Actual growth far exceeded forecasted growth during most of the 1970s, when inflation was 
accelerating, and was far less during most of the 1980s, when inflation was slowing.
9  One could 
reasonably argue that the loose association of the two series is an indication of investors’ inability to 
                                                            
9 Hall notes that the actual nominal forward growth rate is more volatile than the financial market growth rate, as 
Shiller (1981) suggested should be the case in an efficient market.   15 
predict changes in inflation (expected nominal earnings growth was less than ex post growth in the 1970s 
and greater in the 1980s), not evidence of irrational pricing. 
In his second calculation, Hall inverts the cap rate ratio to obtain the capitalization factor 
(price/earnings ratio) with which investors multiply current corporate cash flow to obtain the value of 
securities.  He then compares this factor or multiplier with the 5-year forward growth rate in real 
corporate cash flow (i and g are now real rates).  The expected relationship is positive, although 
nonlinear; with the multiplier equaling 1/(i-g) and i = 0.10, a rise in g from –0.05 to 0 to +0.05 would 
increase the multiplier from 6.7 to 10 to 20. That is, if real interest rates were constant, if ex post five-year 
future real cash flow growth approximated ex ante expected future growth, and if the stock market were 
rationale, these two series should be positively (but nonlinearly) correlated.  As Hall’s Figure 7 shows, the 
actual relationship between the multiplier and g is positive and reasonably close.   
We note, though, that the “5-year” forward real cash flow growth series is based on only four 
years of data in 1996, three years in 1997, two years in 1998 and a single year in 1999 because cash flow 
data were not available after 2000.  If ex post cash flows through 2003 and 2004, respectively, were used 
to construct the real growth rate values in 1998 and 1999, the series would undoubtedly have declined, 
rather than increased, creating a large disconnect between the capitalization factor and the growth rate, 
suggesting possible irrational pricing.  While one could argue that expectations were, in fact, quite high 
and that the plotted data correctly reflected expectations, such expectations themselves could be construed 
as evidence of irrationality because rational investors should have been forecasting mean or trend 
reversion in real cash flows. 
A direct comparison of expected (as implied by observed cap rates) and actual forward real cash 
flow growth rates could be made using the methodology underlying Hall’s nominal growth rate 
comparison, rather than comparing real forward growth with the price-earnings ratio or income multiplier.  
That is, one could compare the actual real forward growth rate with g calculated as i – cap, where i could 
be computed as the average annual ex post real rate of return on stocks during the period.  In this case, a 
positive, linear relationship would again be expected.   16 
We perform this comparison using data from the UK property markets.  Figures 7 and 8 plot a 
constant less the cap rate against the five-year future real rental growth for the UK retail and office 
markets.  (The constant, the average ex post annual real rate of return on property, is computed as the sum 
of the average cap rate during the period and the average future five-year real rental growth.)  While the 
relationships are positive (the correlation coefficients are 0.52 and 0.30 for the two markets), the 
relationship for the office market is much weaker than that for the retail market, and there appears to be 
an inverse relationship between 1977 and 1982 (the correlations for retail and offices for the shorter 1983-
2002 period are 0.73 and 0.35).
10 
The inverse relationship during 1977-82 may be due to violation of the assumption of constant 
real rates of return on property, rather than to irrationality.  The late 1970s was a period of unusually low 
real interest rates worldwide as Central Banks attempted to offset the contractionary impact of the oil 
price shocks, while the early 1980s was a period of high real interest rates as Central Banks turned to 
combating inflation.
11  In the absence of this movement in real interest rates, the inverse correlation of the 
cap rates and the five-year future growth rate in real cash flows would have been stronger.  In any event, 
we interpret these graphs, especially that for retail, as further support in favor of UK investor rationality. 
 
V.  Finance-Based Bubbles Tests 
Two other tests for bubbles have been conducted in the finance literature and subsequently been 
applied to property markets.  The first is based on the proposition that the variance of actual prices is less 
than the variance of fundamental values because the latter contain measurement error (Shiller, 1981).  
Many variance bounds tests of rationality in the market for corporate shares have been undertaken with 
substantial debate over methods and implications (e.g., LeRoy and Porter, 1981, Kleidon, 1986 and 
                                                            
10 The low correlation does NOT appear to be due to irrational real growth expectations.  Following the argument in 
note 8, we would expect future real cash flows to be negatively correlated with deviation of the log of real rent from 
a linear trend.  This is, indeed, the case.  Using data from 1977-2002, the correlation of the deviation from trend and 
the growth in real rents over the next five years is –0.87 for offices and –0.84 for retail shops. 
 
11 For a discussion of U.S. policy during this period, see Feldstein (1994).   17 
Marsh and Merton, 1986).  To the best of our knowledge, only two variance bounds tests of the rationality 
of real estate shares have been executed: Scott (1990) and Brooks et. al. (2001), both of which suggest 
property bubbles. 
Scott analyzes an index of the prices of 13 REITs, one of which is a land trust and others of 
which are really mortgage REITs.  The data period is the late 1960s/early 1970s to 1985 (the REITs had 
varying starting dates).  Because Brooks et. al. analyze a more homogeneous sample and apply the same 
basic test, we discuss their study to illustrate the use of these tests and to highlight the difficulties in 
implementing them. 
Brooks et.al. examine prices of UK property stocks (the Financial Times monthly real estate 
share index) over the 1986-98 period.  They compute two fundamental price series and compare them 
with the share value series in their figures 2 and 3.  Looking at these figures, one wonders why they 
bothered to conduct their empirical tests.  The famous eyeball test indicates clearly that the variance of 
actual prices is far greater, not less, than that of their fundamental value series. 
  The question, then, is just why are their two fundamental series so smooth?  The series are 
alternative estimates of the present value of future real dividends and, given their assumption of rational 
expectations, depend heavily on ex post real dividends.  The longer series, which is constructed 
analogously to the Scott series, computes fundamental value by assuming perfect forecasting of real 
dividends up until a “reversion date” (the end of the sample) when the fundamental value is assumed to be 
the current price.  A constant real discount rate is assumed.
 12  The shorter series that begins in January 
1992 is simply a multiple of the previous period dividends.  Using the perpetual growth Gordon model, 
the multiple is (1+g)/(i-g), where i and g, respectively, are the real discount rate and the growth rate in 
real dividends.  For estimates of these, the FT real estate returns and the average growth rate in real 
dividends for the January 1986-December 1991 period are used; that is, the cap rate and thus the 
                                                            
12 Geltner and Mei (1995) argue that most changes in property market values are due to changes in nominal discount 
rates, not in expected future nominal cash flows.  Note the use of nominal rather than real values (and that their 
evidence is based on a single U.S. property cycle, 1975-92).  We believe that changes in real property market values 
are dominated by changes in expected real cash flows rather than in real required returns.   18 
price/dividend multiple are constant.  And dividends themselves are a smooth series: as the authors state 
“it is well known that companies smooth changes [in] dividend payments over time.” (p. 348).  Using a 
smooth real cash flow series and assuming a constant real discount rate seems certain to produce a 
fundamental value series that is less volatile than any actual price series because this approach assumes 
away changes in real cash flow growth expectations and real discount rates that regularly occur in 
response to new property and capital market information and economic shocks.
13 
Turning to the 1986-93 property cycle, the Brooks et. al. fundamental value series explains only 
seven percent of the doubling of prices during the 1986-89 boom and none of the subsequent reversal.  In 
contrast, recall that the Hendershott and MacGregor (2005a) model of capitalization rates, where real cash 
flow growth expectations were based on extrapolation of last year’s growth rate and reversion to the long 
run mean, explained virtually all of the doubling in real office and retail prices and the reversal.  That is, 
large systematic changes in expected real cash flow growth and thus fundamental value largely explain 
the actual value cycle. 
The second test for bubbles drawn from the finance literature is based on the stationarity and 
cointegration of real stock prices and dividends. Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Diba and Grossman 
(1988) note that if real stock prices and dividends are produced by difference-stationary processes, then in 
the absence of explosive bubbles the standard present value model implies cointegration between real 
stock prices and real dividends.  Diba and Grossman conclude that “stock prices do not contain explosive 
rational bubbles” (p 529). 
Evans (1991) provides insights and perspective to these tests.   He begins with the standard 
pricing model that the real stock price at time t is the present value of the expected next period stock price 
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13 Brooks et. al. note that “it is vital that this model [of fundamental value] is well specified.  It is submitted that a 
mis-specified model can be misleading and produce false fundamental values.” (p 342).   19 
The fundamental value solution to (4) is just equation (1) with E(d) replacing (1-v)R.  The entire class of 
solutions is given by  t t t B FV P + =  where t FV is the fundamental value and t B  is any random variable 
that satisfies ) 1 /( ) ( 1 i B E B t t t + = + .   Note that B is explosive, i.e.,  t
j
j t t B i B E ) 1 ( ) ( + = + , and if bubbles 
exist they have the same return as the asset (i) and thus grow over time at rate i. 
  If the difference in real dividends is a stationary ARMA process and there is no B satisfying the 
above process (there are no bubbles), then the fundamental value solution holds and the difference in real 
price is also a stationary ARMA process and the real price and dividend series are cointegrated.  Thus, to 
paraphrase Evans, if real prices are not more explosive than real cash flows – if real stock prices and real 
dividends are cointegrated, then bubbles do not exist. 
Wang (2000) uses this methodology to test for bubbles in UK property markets.  Office, retail and 
industrial (as well as total) JLW appraised value and rent series were deflated and Johansen cointegration 
tests were performed on annual data for the 1977-97 period.  Cointegration was found for all markets 
except the industrial sector.  That is, bubbles could be ruled out at conventional statistical levels.
14 
Unfortunately, this methodology only identifies noncollapsing bubbles (Evans, 1991).  That is, as 
Wang notes, the method may be inappropriate for a retrospective on a past bubble because bubbles that 
have already burst will not be recognized.  Rather, this approach seeks to identify the “first half” of a 
bubble.  If UK property values experienced a bubble peaking in 1990, we would not expect it to be 
identified using an estimation period ending in 1997 (as in Wang).  An estimation period ending in 1990 
would be better suited to judge whether a bubble in fact occurred. 
 
VI.  Summary 
Periodic sharp sustained increases and then reversals in real asset prices have led many to speak 
of irrational price bubbles.  The worldwide commercial property boom in the late 1980s and the early 
                                                            
14 Wang also tests for and finds evidence of inefficiencies in the property market.  Presumably these reflect the high 
transactions costs and long production lags discussed in Section I above.   20 
1990s reversal is the example most relevant to us.  The general case for bubbles is that real asset prices 
simply move too much given the real cash flows the assets are likely to produce.  High real cash flows 
will generate competitive responses (e.g., additional commercial space) that will reduce future cash flows.  
Thus real prices should be less volatile than real cash flows. 
Sharp price movements are not necessarily evidence of irrationality.  If investors’ best perception 
of fundamentals (future cash flows) improves rapidly and then deteriorates, a price spike is required in an 
efficient market.  High transactions costs and long production lags, characteristics of direct or 
unsecuritized real estate, contribute to greater price variability as do principal-agent problems that cause 
the actions of agents (fund managers/loan officers) to be at odds with principals (investors) interest in 
quickly curtailing supply.  Whether property price swings reflect sharp enough departures from 
fundamental values to imply that investors are either betting on an equivalent to the greater fool theory or 
simply do not understand how property markets work is difficult to judge.  But a number of attempts have 
been made. 
Evidence from Sydney, Stockholm, Kong Kong, Singapore, and US cities suggests irrationality 
during the late 1980s property boom.  In all cases, real property prices rose more rapidly than real rents 
and did not turn around prior to the real rent peak.  That is, capitalization rates rose (value/rent ratios fell) 
with real rents, implying that investors did not build mean reversion into their real cash flow expectations.  
While high selling costs and long production lags prevent nonsecuritized real estate prices from adjusting 
quickly to changes in real cash flow expectations, real prices got so far out of line with real cash flows in 
these markets as to leave little doubt about irrational pricing.  
We then reviewed Hall’s (2001) tests of an irrational US stock market bubble.   Hall presents a 
relatively crude test of three joint hypotheses: the real risk premium is constant, five-year future real cash 
flow growth approximates expected future real cash flow growth, and investors are rational.  His results 
are largely consistent with the joint hypotheses and thus with rationality, although this almost certainly 
would not be the case if his data sample were extended beyond the turn of the century.  (The results are   21 
not consistent when the growth hypothesis is stated in nominal terms, presumably because investors have 
not been good inflation forecasters.) 
When we apply a similar test to UK office and retail property data, there is some evidence of 
rationality.  Further evidence of rationality in UK property markets is contained in Hendershott and 
MacGregor’s analysis of UK capitalization rates.  For both office and retail properties, the capitalization 
rate is negatively related to proxies for expected real cash flow growth (investors will pay more for a 
dollar of rent if rent is expected to grow more rapidly).  Expected real cash flow growth is based on both 
extrapolation of recent real growth and reversion of real cash flows to their long run trend. 
Lastly we considered the application of formal finance tests to the property market.  We argue 
that the “variance bounds” tests performed to date on securitized real estate have been ill designed, if not 
fundamentally flawed.  The calculated fundamental real value series are based on smoothed real cash 
flows (dividends rather than earnings) and assume constancy in real discount rates.  It is thus hardly 
surprising that measures of real asset values are more volatile than such series.  While cointegration tests 
have not revealed bubbles, these tests are able to identify only noncollapsing bubbles and thus are not 
very useful.  It is, after all, the collapse that generally identifies the bubble. 
To summarize, with the exception of the UK property market, data and statistical tests from 
numerous countries suggest that an irrational commercial property bubble developed in the late 1980s 
worldwide and deflated in the early 1990s.  The relevant question at this point is whether investors 
learned from that episode.  Thus future research should concentrate on data subsequent to that cycle, i.e., 
after 1993.  Along these lines, Hendershott and MacGregor (2005b) interpret late 1990s and early 2000s 
data as suggesting that US investors learned about mean reversion from the 1986-93 experience.  22 
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